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## **MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

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
### **LEADING FROM THE CENTER: GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL'S QUEST TO ESTABLISH A MULTINATIONAL COUNTERINSURGENT FORCE IN ISAF – A CASE STUDY IN OPERATIONAL COMMAND**



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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Leading from the Center: General Stanley McChrystal's Quest to Establish a Multinational Counterinsurgent Force in ISAF – A Case Study in Operational Command

**Author:** Major Jason T. Adair, Canadian Army

**Thesis:** General McChrystal's leadership was the primary factor in changing the way ISAF thought, acted, and operated. This change in operational culture was essential in unifying the efforts of a diverse multinational force.

**Discussion:** When General McChrystal assumed command of ISAF in June 2009, the Afghan campaign was in dire need of an overhaul. Years of under-resourcing, ineffective counterinsurgency (COIN) methods, and ill-defined operational objectives placed ISAF on the brink of failure. Exacerbating this situation was the challenge of coalition warfare. However, with increased resources and renewed support from the U.S. and NATO, General McChrystal embarked on a mission to unify ISAF's efforts and salvage the campaign. During his 373 days as the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF), he was instrumental in establishing an operational culture within ISAF that shifted the focus of the force from the tactical defeat of insurgents to the protection of the population.

This analysis of General McChrystal's effort to change ISAF occurs through the lens of Edgar Schien's model of organizational change. This systemic model places the leader at the center of organizational change. Specifically, it considers the interaction of embedding and reinforcing mechanisms in producing change. Viewing General McChrystal's actions through this model provides insight into how he changed the operational culture of a coalition to reinvigorate the NATO campaign in Afghanistan. When viewed through Schien's model, it is clear General McChrystal embedded change by controlling kinetic actions, promoting interaction with Afghans, using crisis to reinforce his intent, coaching COIN best practices, and allocating resources to enable the force to focus on the protection of the population. He reinforced these changes with a clear vision, and a consistent and transparent narrative that transcended the political, strategic, operational, and tactical domains.

**Conclusion:** General McChrystal was the principle determinant in changing ISAF's mindset and was successful in doing so because he sought changes that were *sufficient* to achieve the mission and *similar* enough to unify effort. His command of ISAF demonstrates the pivotal role an operational commander plays in changing the key elements of an organization's culture.

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## Preface

In December 2009 I sat at the Chateau Laurier Hotel in Ottawa and listened to General Stanley McChrystal provide an overview of the Afghan mission. Having served three tours in Afghanistan and experienced its inherent complexity and the frustration that stems from the environment, I was very impressed with his candor, humility, sincerity, and belief that ISAF could assist and enable Afghanistan to function effectively as a free nation. However, from a professional perspective, I was in awe of the challenge that faced him and his team. In September 2010, after his tour in Afghanistan had ended, I was fortunate enough to hear General McChrystal speak again, this time at Johns Hopkins University. He was more reflective about his time as the Commander of ISAF and rather than speak of the situation in Afghanistan, he articulated his approach to leadership based on experiences throughout his career. His passion for leadership and the lessons he conveyed resonated with me and spawned the idea for this paper.

Fundamentally, an officer's year at an intermediate Staff College allows for reflection and inquiry with the aim of improving professional judgment. However, this aim can be further simplified; it is a period, within a personal and professional continuum, which provides the opportunity to focus on becoming a better leader. In this spirit, this experience forced me to ask myself some tough questions about how I have led and how I will lead in the future. Perhaps as importantly, it has given me insight into why other leaders make the decisions they do.

With the aim of becoming a better leader in mind, why would a Canadian infantry officer write about the recent experiences of a U.S. Army General in Afghanistan? The answer is threefold; first, Afghanistan is the theater that shaped many of my professional beliefs and perspectives; hence, analyzing it from the perspective of the theater commander at a different point in time broadens and elevates one's perspective. Second, General McChrystal's command

of ISAF was recent and provides insight into the challenges facing operational commanders in the contemporary operating environment. Lastly, because there has been very little analysis of General McChrystal's leadership in Afghanistan, this topic provides the opportunity to contribute, from an academic perspective, to a subject that has yet to be rigorously considered. In this vein, this paper represents an attempt to provide an initial examination of his approach in one specific area, the changing of the mindset of ISAF to enable it to succeed in the counterinsurgency mission.

Nine years of conflict has reinforced the reality that war, above all else, is a human endeavor. Western militaries are conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against enemies that they were ill prepared to confront and in environments where leaders at all levels have been challenged and forced to adapt. They have had to shift their mindset from that of a conventional warfighter to that of a counterinsurgent. While there has been considerable discussion and much written about tactical leadership in these environments, operational leadership has not been considered to the same extent. Like tactical leaders, operational leaders have had to adapt their thinking and approach to command to the character of the environment. The operational battlespace in which technology has been marginalized by human factors, has forced operational commanders to redefine how to succeed and amplified the importance of leveraging every facet of culture to contribute to success. Exacerbating this fundamental shift are the inherent requirements of multinational coalition operations, which demand unifying the efforts of forces possessing diverse cultures and capabilities. General McChrystal's experience provides a medium through which to gain insight into the challenges placed upon an operational commander in such an environment.

The goal of this paper extends beyond highlighting the character of operational command and focuses on General McChrystal's efforts to establish an operational culture within ISAF that was consistent with campaign objectives. Long-term success will be achieved when adequate forces conduct operations in a way that considers Afghan goals and their culture. General McChrystal understood this reality and sought, amidst an ongoing war, to unify the efforts of soldiers and civilians from over 20% of the world's nations through the establishment of a counter-insurgent culture. Clearly, this represents a remarkable challenge. However, it is also a challenge that other commanders will face in the future.

The outcome in Afghanistan remains in question and ultimately resides with the Afghan people. Dissecting the recent past is instructive but also fraught with academic risks, specifically that empirical data is considered in an environment that is ever-changing. While I have strove to examine, and in some cases, infer, the causal factors behind the situation in Afghanistan and General McChrystal's approach to change, it is difficult to make key deductions when long-term outcomes are unknown. Additionally, from a historiographic perspective, research was difficult because there are very few secondary sources and little interpretation of the period in question. In response to this deficiency, I have consulted an array of varying primary sources and products of journalism to balance perspectives, opinions, and ultimately facts. In doing so, this paper became an effort in analytical synthesis with rigor sought by using history and doctrine as reinforcing mechanisms to underpin analysis. Ultimately, I have tested this thesis against the accuracy of information upon which the analysis is based and the practicality of accompanying conclusions. While I believe the basic outline for the argument is sound, it is also unfinished. To avoid outrunning facts, conclusions are derived from a relatively brief period within the campaign.

There are two additional points that require qualification. In outlining the situation in Afghanistan, I have done so broadly and, for the most part, critically. This approach obfuscates the tactical successes that were occurring and the progress that is being made in some areas. In being critical, in no way do I want to be interpreted as questioning the efforts and sacrifices of those “on the ground” who were doing everything in their power and ability to “make things work”. Secondly, civilians play a key, if not decisive, role in this campaign. I have not focused on their role or contributions.

In developing a topic, researching it and ultimately writing this paper, I wish to acknowledge the patience and insight of my thesis advisor, Dr. Don Bittner. His passion for history and the profession of arms is infectious. As a retired Marine and the longest serving member of the faculty at the Command and Staff College, his contribution to the defense of his nation over the past fifty years is remarkable.

General McChrystal, in spite of his hectic schedule, made time to meet and correspond with me and I will always be appreciative of this. His insights, along with those of his Command Sergeant-Major for many years, Mike Hall, were extremely valuable. To discuss leadership with these two great leaders was an incredible experience.

I would also like to thank two warrior-scholars, Brigadier-General Jon Vance and Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope for assisting me and reviewing this paper.

As always, my wife Leslie remains my biggest fan and supports my fascination and passion for my chosen profession. Without complaint, she tolerated the many hours I spent reading, thinking, and writing.

## **Prologue**

Often referred to as the “Graveyard of Empires,” Afghanistan has been an arena of irregular warfare in which there was a consistent outcome – the Afghans were the victors. Most notably, Alexander’s Army, three separate British Field Forces and the Russian Army were defeated by the Afghans. Out of necessity, with history against them, a coalition led by the United States (U.S.) attacked terrorists in Afghanistan following 9/11. These initial attacks successfully drove the Taliban from power and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan but also marked the beginning of a counterinsurgency campaign that continues to this day. From 2003 to 2009, operations in Iraq overshadowed the campaign in Afghanistan. With the inauguration of President Barack Obama and the drawdown of forces in Iraq, the U.S. focus shifted to Afghanistan.

Symbolic of this shift was the appointment of General Stanley McChrystal as the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The majority of the public remembers General McChrystal for the “Rolling Stone Incident” which sparked his retirement. Stemming from the high profile of this incident, this unfortunate public perception eclipses the efforts of General McChrystal and the changes he incited to give Afghanistan, NATO, and ISAF an opportunity to succeed. His command of ISAF is symbolic of a new era of American Generalship.

While General Robert E. Lee led Confederate Forces from the front, and General Dwight Eisenhower led Allied Forces in Europe from the rear, General Stanley McChrystal led ISAF from the center. In doing so, he began to transform ISAF into a network of counterinsurgents that was able to effectively counter a resilient insurgency and provide better protection to the Afghan people.

## **Introduction**

*The dusty dogmas of the past are insufficient to confront our stormy present. As our world is new, we must think anew.<sup>1</sup>*  
-- Abraham Lincoln (1863)

When General Stanley McChrystal assumed command of ISAF in June 2009, the Afghan campaign was in dire need of an overhaul. Years of under-resourcing, ineffective counterinsurgency (COIN) methods, and ill-defined operational objectives placed ISAF on the brink of failure. These realities were exacerbated by the challenges of coalition warfare. ISAF represented an ad hoc organization composed of forces from over 23% of the world's nations, each with their own strategic interests, and forces that were technologically, doctrinally, and culturally unique. However, with increased resources and renewed support from the U.S and NATO, General McChrystal embarked on a mission to coordinate their efforts and salvage the campaign. During his 373 days as the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF), he shifted the focus of the force from the tactical defeat of insurgents to the protection of the population. In doing so, he highlighted the theater commander's role in leading change and aligning the tactical actions of a diverse multinational force with strategic objectives. General McChrystal's efforts highlight the unique character of operational leadership in COIN that had been aptly dubbed a "strategy of tactics."<sup>2</sup>

General McChrystal was pivotal in leading dramatic changes in ISAF at a critical period in the campaign. However, to provide meaning to his efforts, they must be placed in context. Successive commanders of ISAF have faced common problems but each commander also confronted unique circumstances. These represented the interplay of strategic dimensions, operational factors, and tactical conditions at particular points in time.<sup>3</sup> General McChrystal built on the strategy put in place by General David McKiernan, while General David Petraeus has

since built upon the efforts of General McChrystal by broadening the campaign, further refining operational culture, and continuing to match resources to the dynamic theater environment.

Within these bounds, the salient feature of General McChrystal's command, and a key aspect of operational command in COIN, was his effort to establish within ISAF an operational culture that unified thought, purpose, and action.<sup>4</sup>

In seeking to change the way in which ISAF prosecuted the campaign, General McChrystal sought unity of effort through clarity of purpose. He gained political and strategic clarity, secured and allocated additional resources, prioritized effort, and increased the responsiveness of ISAF's organizational structure. Most notably, amidst ongoing operations, he led ISAF, figuratively and physically, from its center.<sup>5</sup> With unwavering resolve, he was a catalyst in changing the focus of operations from the defeat of insurgent fighters to the protection of the Afghan population. In doing so, he established an operational culture that unified ISAF actions to reflect the overarching COIN strategy. General McChrystal's leadership was the primary factor in changing the way ISAF thought, acted, and operated. This change in operational culture was essential in unifying the efforts of a coalition. While achieving coalition unity of effort has been a constant challenge for such commanders throughout history, doing so by changing the operational culture of as diverse a coalition as ISAF during a counterinsurgency campaign is unprecedented.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, this paper is a case study in the contemporary character of operational command.

### **Methodology**

First, this paper will establish context by providing an overview of the situation in Afghanistan. Then, the focus will shift to highlighting the importance of operational culture and define the unique character of operational command in COIN. With the context established, an

analysis of General McChrystal's actions in establishing a counterinsurgent operational culture in ISAF will occur by using Edgar Schien's model of organizational culture as a framework.

### **The Situation in Afghanistan – 2009**

*There can be no government without an army, no army without money, no money without prosperity, and no prosperity without justice and good administration.*<sup>7</sup>

-- Ibn Qutayba, a notable 9th Century Islamic scholar, in the “Circle of Justice”

Between 2001 and 2009, the Taliban-dominated insurgency in Afghanistan emerged as a highly effective decentralized organization, loosely unified by the common purpose of expelling foreign forces and re-establishing a Sunni state. In doing so, the Taliban countered, with increasing effectiveness, against the ISAF lines of effort of governance, development, and security. The net effects of their efforts were the destabilization of security and undermining the legitimacy of the Kabul government. While Afghans did not consider the Taliban a popular movement, many were convinced the insurgency represented a threat to the Karzai government.<sup>8</sup> By 2009, the Taliban had gained momentum and held the operational initiative within the theater and the tactical initiative within contested areas, particularly in the eastern and southern portions of the country. Why, between 2006 and 2009, were ISAF operations ineffective in breaking the cycle of violence and reducing the crisis in confidence endemic in the Afghan populace? There are three primary reasons that in turn created a number of mission jeopardizing effects.

First and most fundamentally, the NATO effort in Afghanistan represented an *intervention* COIN effort.<sup>9</sup> This led to varying views on the campaign's objectives within NATO and the Afghan government. In fact, President Karzai viewed the campaign as “ISAF’s war on his terrain.”<sup>10</sup> The Afghan government focused on domestic governance issues while leaving ISAF to counter the insurgency. For ISAF, this made intelligence gathering and connecting with the population difficult. However, most importantly, Afghan security forces were not growing at the

rate required to assume responsibility for countering the insurgent threat. Consequently, ISAF conducted a high proportion of unilateral operations, further amplifying the reality that ISAF was, in many parts of the country, “an Army of strangers in a land of strangers.”<sup>11</sup> Without the complete commitment of the Afghan government there was a degree of futility in NATO’s efforts. As governmental advisor David Kilcullen stressed, “You are only as good as the government you are supporting.”<sup>12</sup>

Secondly, neither NATO nor the U.S. had a long-term strategic vision for Afghanistan. This provided little coherence to ISAF’s campaign plan. While conventional Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces incrementally transferred to ISAF command between 2004 and 2006, an overarching strategy did not accompany this reorganization. ISAF was not fighting a single war but overseeing a number of “local fights.” Amidst this disparity of purpose and methods, the Taliban gained momentum.<sup>13</sup>

Lastly, ISAF, in a contest with a growing insurgency, *lacked the requisite means* to influence the population.<sup>14</sup> Objectives reflected the scarcity of means, producing an enemy-centric tactical focus that did not protect the population but often merely reciprocated insurgent violence. Operations “were based, in large measure, on ‘persistent raiding,’ an approach that was inconsistent with the evolving character of the conflict and proved inadequate in connection with achieving an outcome consistent with NATO and Afghan objectives.”<sup>15</sup> An insurgent focus created an underlying operational culture within ISAF, especially at the tactical level, that did not embrace traditional COIN best practices. Effort was focused on defeating insurgents that invariably led to civilian casualties and undermined ISAF credibility. At both the operational and tactical levels, the local defeat of insurgents eclipsed efforts to gain the support of the population.

In 2009, ISAF confronted a determined enemy and supported a weak ally in the Karzai government. Resources and tactics had begun to dictate the strategy and ISAF was on a path to self-defeat.<sup>16</sup> Afghanistan represented a cauldron of competing interests and Afghans were disillusioned equally with ISAF and their own government. In an unvarnished assessment, General McChrystal summarized the situation:

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice has resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis in confidence among Afghans – in both their government and the international community – that undermines our credibility and emboldens insurgents.<sup>17</sup>

David Kilcullen considered the situation in a broader context, writing in 2009 that, “ISAF seems be in an adaptation battle against a rapidly evolving insurgency that repeatedly absorbed and adapted to past efforts to defeat it...”<sup>18</sup> While bringing additional forces into the fight might produce further insurgent adaptation, their influx together with a shift from an insurgent focus to a population focus was considered essential. To manage these elements of *means* and *ways*, from almost every perspective, the Afghanistan campaign required reinvigoration. Most importantly however, throughout the force, operational cultural needed to reflect effective population-centric COIN practices.

### **Operational Culture**

*Madness would be near the man who sees things through the veil at once of two customs, two educations, and two environments.*<sup>19</sup>  
-- T.E. Lawrence (1922)

Analyzing military successes or failure usually occurs through the prisms of “leadership, personnel, training, or a combination of all of the above.”<sup>20</sup> In addition to these dimensions, culture, recently dubbed the “bedrock of military effectiveness,” is emerging as increasingly important dimension of military operations.<sup>21</sup> Culture’s importance reflects the reality that in

contemporary conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, “wars amongst the people,” the support of people is often the primary determinant of success. Gaining support of people demands understanding their culture and adapting one’s own culture to achieve an operational advantage. These intersecting elements of culture “influence[s] how people make judgments about what is right and wrong and assess what is important and unimportant” and “[e]ffective Army leaders understand and appreciate their own culture (individual, military, and national) in relation to the various cultures of others in the operational area.”<sup>22</sup> That culture can have a decisive effect on operational outcomes makes it another dimension by which to consider military actions.

Operational culture is generally defined as “those aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation; conversely, the military actions that influence the culture of an area of operations.”<sup>23</sup> During COIN operations, especially in cases in which the counterinsurgent force is multinational, operational culture is about achieving a common perspective of the contested population and an approach that is *similar* and *sufficient* to achieve objectives.<sup>24</sup> In this vein, operational culture seeks to lift the *moral fog* essential to the counterinsurgent understanding the environment and acting effectively.<sup>25</sup> Seeing the environment with greater clarity often reduces the need for kinetic action, breeds unity of effort, and represents a key factor in operational command.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the aforementioned definition of operational culture is refined to *the shared beliefs, values, and behaviors that characterize and bind an operational force.*

### **The Unique Character of Operational Command during COIN Operations**

*You cannot command what you do not control. Therefore ‘unity of command’ (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) means little in this environment. Instead, we need to create ‘unity of effort’ at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least. This depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem, platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction.<sup>27</sup>*

-- David Kilcullen (2007)

As the character of war evolves, command as a function, must adapt to meet the demands of a particular environment. Before examining the unique character of operational command in COIN, it is essential to remember the enduring nature of operational leadership:

Operational leadership focuses on achieving strategic effects within the operating environment using direct and indirect influence, both internally and externally, based on a common vision that builds unity of effort while employing tactical activities and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>28</sup>

The most important element of this focus is the requirement to achieve unity of effort. The imperative of unity of effort in COIN is evident in history. Writing in 1964, David Galula emphasized that COIN “must respect the principle of single direction” and warned that because success in a counterinsurgency is a multiplication of efforts, “if one (element of effort) is nil, the product will be zero.”<sup>29</sup> What distinguishes operational command in COIN is the multiplicity and complexities of the sources of *cognitive tension* that operational commanders must overcome to achieve unity of effort.<sup>30</sup> (See Appendix F) Operational commanders must reduce this tension and navigate the chasms that exist between governance, security, strategy, and tactics and seek to unify the efforts of the force.

Commanding at the operational level in a COIN intervention effort places commanders at the nexus of security issues and host-nation governance. At once, commanders direct military operations to improve stability while also leading efforts to rebuild the authority of the host nation’s government. The operational commander must direct a diverse set of forces and agencies whose activities are often outside the bounds of traditional military operations. These realities alter operational command’s traditional practices in two ways.<sup>31</sup>

First, commanders cannot seek to control the actions of the force by prescriptively conveying their intent.<sup>32</sup> Most fundamentally, in order to convey intent, commanders must

define success. In a COIN environment, many interdependent factors contribute to success and make such definition difficult. Defining success requires broad descriptions of effective activities and approaches to focus tactical action while accounting for the variable local environments. With success defined, to foster initiative and account for local conditions, commanders need to outline objectives and priorities. They must ensure their subordinates understand their mission in the context of larger objectives and establish clear expectations that support the overarching strategy.

Second, COIN naturally *diffuses* an operational commander's *power to make decisions* – he must lead indirectly, unifying effort through reinforcing a common narrative and building consensus.<sup>33</sup> The commander's proximity to policy, politics, and the number of stakeholders in key decisions, often demands deferring decisions to the host-nation's government and building consensus within alliances.<sup>34</sup> This was the case in ISAF; not only Afghan objectives but also those of all troop-contributing nations required consideration. Additionally, the decentralized nature of the COIN fight further diffuses the purview of the operational commander's decision-making. The decentralization of tactical forces and the multination composition of ISAF represent the conditions that challenge unity of effort in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, for every COMISAF, unity of effort was essential as “without unity, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit.”<sup>35</sup>

The multinational composition of ISAF exacerbated the challenge of unifying effort in Afghanistan. Michael Canna, a U.S. Air Force officer who examined multinational operations, summarizes this challenge:

The multinational commander has to strike a delicate balance between managing a heterogeneous military force with preeminent allegiance to their national governments and subject to the desires of their respective political leadership, and

employing these forces as a homogenous fighting force with maximum military effectiveness.<sup>36</sup>

In June 2009, there were approximately 61000 soldiers from 42 different nations, representatives from three major international organizations (European Union [EU], NATO and the United Nations [UN]) and countless other governmental and non-governmental agencies in some way tied to ISAF.<sup>37</sup> Each of these organizations was unique with its own culture, agenda, strengths, and weaknesses.

Within such a coalition, unique strategic cultures drive the actions of soldiers from each of the troop contributing nations. Multinational force command arrangements rarely subsume national agendas and caveats resulting in the restricted employment of forces at the operational level.<sup>38</sup> In 2009, within ISAF, approximately 20 percent of forces were constrained in their employment by national caveats. An example of this is the German caveat that limits the employment of their forces to the relatively peaceful northern part of the Afghanistan.<sup>39</sup> Less qualitatively but of no less consequence, many nations contributing to ISAF simply are not accustomed to war and most have little experience in COIN. This resulted in the deployment of organizations with widely varying attributes, skills, and capabilities.<sup>40</sup> Hence, as a coalition, unity of effort becomes extremely important because unity of command is not achievable.<sup>41</sup>

Adding to the challenge of unifying the efforts of a multinational force is the requirement to decentralize resources and decision-making. COIN demands decentralization because “forces must secure the population working closely with indigenous military, police, and civilian officials.”<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, forces working amongst the population are able to build relationships, address grievances at the grassroots level and in very real terms, shape the perceptions of the populace.<sup>43</sup> Decentralization requires commanders to trust their subordinates, the essence of mission command, a factor highlighted in U.S. Army COIN doctrine:

Mission command is ideally suited to the mosaic nature of COIN operations. Local commanders have the best grasp of their situations. Under mission command, they are given access to or control the resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage (information operations) and civil-military operations. Thus effective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible down to their level. Mission command encourages the initiative of subordinates and facilitates the learning that must occur at every level. It is a major characteristic of a COIN force that can adapt and react at least as quickly as the insurgents.<sup>44</sup>

In the end, leaders at successive levels of command must provide clear guidance in order to maintain campaign coherence and aim to leverage the factors they can influence to create the conditions for the success of their subordinates.<sup>45</sup> Specifically, operational commanders must surrender their traditional illusory perspective of control and enforce their intent without undermining decentralized operations.

For the operational commander, there appear to be three critical factors essential to achieving unity: a clear belief in and understanding of the mission throughout the force; an integrated and responsive force structure that contributes to the effectiveness of the overall effort; and an operational culture that embraces COIN tactics that are consistent with the overall strategy. However, while achieving unity of effort is difficult, it is also essential and remains the most important factor an operational commander can influence.

### **Establishing a Counterinsurgent Culture with ISAF**

*We need to think and act very differently to be successful.<sup>46</sup>*  
-- General Stanley McChrystal (2009)

The first factor in examining General McChrystal's effort to change the operational culture of ISAF is General McChrystal himself. How did his approach to command and experience shape the process of change? General McChrystal's appointment as the commander of ISAF was symbolic of the increased U.S. commitment to Afghanistan. As Bruce Elleman, who edited an extensive study on the topic of naval leadership notes, "A major challenge for any

military organization is to assign, within the options available, an officer with the appropriate skill sets and personality traits to the right position at the right time.”<sup>47</sup> Regarded as one of the top commanders in the U.S. Army, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen selected General McChrystal to re-vitalize the Afghan campaign. It is important to highlight the role his personality, approach to command, and previous experiences contributed to his quest to change ISAF’s operational culture.

The first factor is his leadership style and approach to command. General McChrystal’s style of command seemed simple but it was complex.<sup>48</sup> Humble, with an unwavering resolve, he was the stereotypical “Level 5 Leader.”<sup>49</sup> Both transformational<sup>50</sup> and catalytic,<sup>51</sup> he practiced adaptive leadership.<sup>52</sup> While he did not place mission accomplishment below any other factor, he understood that above all else, war is a human endeavor, based on relationships and trust.<sup>53</sup> General McChrystal’s personality and approach to command drove change in ISAF and contributed greatly to his ability to develop and maintain relationships with key Afghan players and leaders across the coalition.<sup>54</sup>

The second factor was his experience in COIN operations. General McChrystal gained theoretical tactical knowledge of insurgency and COIN during his time as a member of the 7<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group. His tenure as the commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) exposed him to operational and tactical COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan for five years, between 2003 and 2008. Lastly, the period he spent as the Director of the Joint Staff provided him valuable insight into the political and strategic dimensions of the ongoing COIN campaigns. Together, these experiences provided him both broad and deep perspectives surrounding the demands of COIN. (See Appendix A)

The last factor was his experience in leading change. General J.F.C. Fuller wrote, “the average General cannot tolerate any change in preconceived ideas; prejudice sticks to his brain like tar to a blanket.”<sup>55</sup> An innovator, General McChrystal broke Fuller’s paradigm in every respect. He successfully led significant changes as the Commander of the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment, JSOC and as the Director of the Joint Staff.<sup>56</sup> In general, all of these changes focused on “pulling everyone into a shared consciousness and purpose” to improve efficiency and effectiveness.<sup>57</sup> He notes that in leading each of these changes, his experiences were similar:

“It always began with the organizations not believing we were serious about forcing change. It was only over time, when the message they received was consistent, relentless, and unwilling to back off - that each really began to move.”<sup>58</sup>

General McChrystal highlights the role of the leader in implementing change, “The leader cannot just want it or direct it – in most cases the leader must ‘live it’ to the point where driving is a combination of leading by example, pulling, and pushing the team along.”<sup>59</sup> His previous experience in leading change shaped the way he approached implementing changes in ISAF.

Next is the role of the assessment process as the foundation of change. General McChrystal used the assessment process to confirm what was in the “realm of the possible” in Afghanistan. His assessment of the paradoxical strategic problem in Afghanistan served as a driver for strategic reform and identified operational culture as a key factor in ISAF’s success.<sup>60</sup> Its results became the analytical basis from which the mindset of ISAF would shift from an enemy-centric to a population-centric approach to COIN.

Immediately upon his appointment as COMISAF, General McChrystal was tasked with providing to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates an assessment that answered three questions: (1) Can ISAF achieve the mission? (2) If so, how should ISAF go about achieving the mission? and (3) What is required to achieve the mission?<sup>61</sup> Beyond these specific

questions, the assessment aimed to validate whether ISAF was “doing the right things” and evaluate how well ISAF was implementing the existing campaign plan.<sup>62</sup> This purpose illustrates General McChrystal’s understanding of the inextricable link between strategy and tactics in COIN.<sup>63</sup> Ultimately, this assessment provided the cornerstone for the way ahead for the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan.

The assessment process was rigorous and not constrained by assumptions.<sup>64</sup> Completing the assessment was the Strategic Assessment Group, an array of multi-disciplined experts who sought to identify the drivers of Afghanistan’s instability and consider these factors against the ISAF approach.<sup>65</sup> This team looked beyond strategic abstractions and provided a concrete synopsis of the situation and equally tangible recommendations.

Fundamentally, the assessment concluded that success depended on an adequately resourced and integrated civilian-military COIN campaign.<sup>66</sup> This conclusion had significant political, strategic, and operational impacts. Politically and strategically, in recommending this dramatically different approach, it forced the necessary discussion required to clarify objectives, foster a common understanding of the mission’s demands, and provided the ‘proof’ that more resources were required. At the operational level, the assessment served as the driver for transforming ISAF into a counterinsurgent force. Its findings reinforced the essential elements of a COIN campaign: a common understanding of the mission was required, structures and processes needed to be adapted to improve effectiveness and efficiency, and an operational culture that transcended the cultural diversity of the coalition needed to be established.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, General McChrystal also used the assessment process as the platform to lead change in ISAF. In doing so, he gained a better personal understanding of the environment, reinforced his intent, built personal relationships, and imbued a sense of focus.<sup>68</sup>

Based on the assessment, to achieve the mission<sup>69</sup> General McChrystal determined that ISAF's operational culture needed to focus on "protecting the Afghan people, understanding their environment, and building relationships with them."<sup>70</sup> These changes stemmed from the requirement to consider the Afghan aperture of the situation and replace the enemy-centric predisposition of ISAF with an operational culture that reflected population-centric COIN.<sup>71</sup> General McChrystal determined that these three fundamental changes would be *sufficient* to create enough *similarity* of approach to unify the efforts of the force.

Assessing General McChrystal's actions to change ISAF's operational culture will occur through the framework of Edgar Schien's model of cultural change.<sup>72</sup> Within this model, Schien views leadership as a key driver of cultural change because "[w]hen we examine culture and leadership closely, we see that they are two sides of the same coin; neither can really be understood by itself."<sup>73</sup> This systemic model places an organizational leader at the center of change and uses interdependent embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to propel change. Embedding mechanisms represent the actions and approaches a leader uses to inculcate change while reinforcement mechanisms include vision, structures, and systems that support embedding mechanisms.<sup>74</sup> This model seems counterintuitive in that "many leaders believe they can change culture by using the quicker, easier reinforcing mechanisms, but real culture change comes from first ensuring that the embedding mechanisms are in place."<sup>75</sup>

Before analyzing specific mechanisms, it is essential to identify three factors that underpinned General McChrystal's overall effort. First, he recognized the need to reestablish ISAF's moral authority and create, across NATO and the force itself, a renewed belief in the ISAF mission. This belief, and the values surrounding it, would form the basis of change, raising expectations and ultimately increase accountability throughout ISAF.<sup>76</sup> Next, General

McChrystal handpicked his “inner circle,” his “apostles,” all of whom had the “credibility, skills, connections, and reputations” to lead and in some cases, force change.<sup>77</sup> This inner circle was built around a climate of independence and expectation and not only fuelled change on McChrystal’s behalf but let him focus on areas that required his personal attention.<sup>78</sup> The last factor was the criticality of time and the resultant sense of urgency that General McChrystal imbued throughout the force. He was under pressure to produce results and recognized that success was one thing, but it had to occur quickly. The mantra within ISAF headquarters became: “In considering time, good organizations look at the calendar while great organizations look at their watch.”<sup>79</sup>

The first embedding mechanism is *what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control.* This mechanism represents the principal means by which General McChrystal transformed ISAF. He had no illusions about those things he could not control and adopted a command and feedback approach,<sup>80</sup> based on a common understanding of his intent and trust between himself and those who had the “best information and the ability to act.”<sup>81</sup> However, he did control and measure actions that would undermine the mission and trends that served as indicators for success or failure.

Broadly, General McChrystal measured general trends in the war, ISAF’s progress against the campaign plan, and the performance of individuals and organizations “against best practice norms for counterinsurgency, reconstruction, and stability operations.”<sup>82</sup> However, more specifically, in analyzing directives and metrics, it is clear he aimed to control actions that indicated an insurgent focus and those that ignored or disrespected the Afghan populace. He issued specific directions for tactical activities including the escalation of force, driving of vehicles, entering Afghan residences, and the use of airpower. He also made partnering with

Afghan forces the expected standard, linking it with the long-term success of the mission. "We won't win if we do not partner. We have to work around the challenges and we have to get on with it – all of us."<sup>83</sup> Most notably, however, he exercised significant control in preventing civilian casualties (CIVCAS).<sup>84</sup> The issue of CIVCAS was a demonstrable metric that indicated the level to which the force protected the population. General McChrystal used this as a vehicle to incite change and focus the actions of the force.<sup>85</sup>

Another area in which he took personal interest was managing the narrative of the campaign. His focus on this area highlights the role of the operational commander in defining and reinforcing success. General McChrystal recognized that "the side with the most compelling narrative will succeed" and conveyed messages with increased timeliness and transparency while ensuring they matched actions.<sup>86</sup>

Lastly and perhaps, most vexing, General McChrystal constantly communicated, in general terms, the requirement to *accept risks to protect the population, build relationships, and gain intelligence.*<sup>87</sup> In this vein, on one occasion, he received an Email from a U.S. Army Sergeant in Kandahar who questioned the limitations on the use of force: "I am writing because it was said you don't care about the troops and have made it harder to defend ourselves."<sup>88</sup> Not only did General McChrystal respond, but also travelled to the Sergeant's outpost, accompanied him on a patrol, with only an Afghan aide and one member of his personal security team, and used the opportunity to explain why restricting the use of firepower was so important.<sup>89</sup> In doing so, he attempted to foster an understanding of the imperatives of exercising restraint and operating in close proximity to the population.

In paying attention to, measuring, and controlling specific elements of the campaign, General McChrystal's priorities became clear. Strategic stakeholders and tactical units alike

focused on the metrics and actions that General McChrystal identified as critical and aligned their own efforts accordingly. This embedded clear expectations, standards, and priorities within ISAF.

The second embedding mechanism *is how leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises*. COIN's complexity invokes mistakes, which in some cases lead to crises.<sup>90</sup> Overall, General McChrystal seems to have subscribed to Napoleon's adage that the "first qualification of a general-in-chief is to possess a cool head, so that things may appear to him in their true proportion and as they really are."<sup>91</sup> Fundamentally, he understood that underwriting honest mistakes was essential to maintaining the trust required in decentralized operations and that responding predictably would maintain a culture of transparency and promote timely and accurate reporting.<sup>92</sup> In this vein, he responded to critical incidents in a manner that extracted key lessons and reinforced his intent. His response to an ISAF action that caused CIVCAS highlights his approach. In speaking to his subordinate commanders he emphatically stated, "Because of CIVCAS I think that we have just about eroded out credibility here in Afghanistan. The constant repeat of CIVCAS is now so dangerous that it threatens the mission...I want confirmation that every soldier in the command from every country understands the Tactical Directive."<sup>93</sup> General McChrystal used crisis as an opportunity to clearly define the challenges of the fight and in doing so, reinforce focus, urgency, and intent.

*Allocation of resources* represents a critical task confronting operational leaders and the next embedding mechanism. Throughout his tenure as COMISAF, General McChrystal managed a steady increase in both military and civilian resources. He prioritized resources by designating a main effort and complementary shaping and supporting efforts. To reverse Taliban momentum, the preponderance of military resources were allocated to areas of the country more

susceptible to insurgent influence.<sup>94</sup> This translated into increased “troop density” and tactical action that allowed for persistent presence and reduced the requirement for a reliance on firepower as the sole means to defeat insurgents. Furthermore, in an effort to increase the capacity of Afghan security forces, he also allocated significant resources to the NATO Training Mission. The focus of resources for civil activities and funding for development programs was to areas in which security conditions permitted such activities. In decentralizing and integrating resources and weighting them against the priority of effort, he operationalized the strategy to address disparate conditions with the appropriate type and volume of resources.

*Deliberate role-modeling, teaching and coaching* is another embedding mechanism and an area in which General McChrystal focused considerable effort. He elucidated his intent and ensured tactical actions reflected the best way to achieve objectives. In doing so, he circulated within the theater continuously. He felt it was important that soldiers had the opportunity to “look him in the eye.”<sup>95</sup> Canadian Brigadier-General Jon Vance was impressed with General McChrystal’s approach to *battlefield circulation*, noting that his visits were “frequent, unhurried, that he always brought key members of his staff, and that he promoted discussion while asking insightful questions that subtly reinforced his intent.”<sup>96</sup> Occasionally, while circulating, he immersed himself in the details of a specific tactical event to reinforce positive actions or highlight required improvements.<sup>97</sup> General McChrystal also used *YouTube* to communicate his “Eight imperatives of COIN”<sup>98</sup> and publications such as the *ISAF Mirror* and *COIN Common Sense* featured articles highlighting effective COIN practices.<sup>99</sup> More revolutionary were General McChrystal’s efforts to ensure those forces deploying to Afghanistan were better prepared and inculcated with ISAF’s operational culture before their arrival. To achieve this, he issued “Counterinsurgency Training Guidance” that was distributed to all troop-contributing

nations to standardize and focus their preparations, instill the counterinsurgent mindset, and reduce the adaptation required upon deployment.<sup>100</sup> This concept eventually led to the development of COIN Joint Training Standards which were similarly distributed.

Indirectly, within the theater, he influenced actions using the principle of the “directed telescope.”<sup>101</sup> Specifically, he employed the COIN Advisory and Assistance Team that “observed, assessed, and reported on COIN activities in an effort to assist commanders, identify trends, and disseminate best practices throughout ISAF.”<sup>102</sup> His Command Sergeant-Major also served as a “directed telescope,” visiting units, articulating and explaining the essentials of COIN while gaining valuable feedback from those “on the ground.”<sup>103</sup> Through a multi-faceted approach, General McChrystal indirectly repeated and reinforced the mission’s importance, how best to execute it, and extended his influence beyond the Afghan theater to optimize the effectiveness of deploying forces from the moment they arrived in Afghanistan.

The last two embedding mechanisms are *how leaders allocate rewards and status* and *how leaders select, promote, and excommunicate*. General McChrystal placed a premium on effective and open-minded leadership and was intimately involved in the assignment of key U.S. personnel to Afghanistan.<sup>104</sup> He ensured meritorious and valorous action was rewarded but he also took a personal interest in acknowledging soldiers who exercised restraint and incurred risks to gain information and prevent casualties. However, outside of U.S. forces, it was difficult for General McChrystal to exert significant influence over the appointment or removal of officers. By carefully selecting officers for key positions and rewarding actions congruent with effective COIN practices, he further embedded expectations and standards throughout the force.

General McChrystal used various reinforcement mechanisms to support embedding mechanisms. The first two reinforcement mechanisms are *organizational structure, design,*

*organizational systems, and procedures.* To better enable decision-making and synchronize effort, he believed that ISAF had to organize like a network to connect key players in the Afghan theater.<sup>105</sup>

Such a network “starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust. Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide, and effectively act.”<sup>106</sup>

To create this network, General McChrystal made one fundamental change that allowed ISAF to prosecute the campaign more inclusively with Afghans and interagency partners while creating as much unity of command as possible (within a coalition). He established a “corps-like” headquarters, labeled the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) that served as the intermediate headquarters between ISAF Headquarters and Regional Commands. The IJC was organized along cross-functional lines with the task of conducting the “full spectrum of COIN operations and stability operations in support of COMISAF’s campaign plan,” thereby allowing ISAF to focus on “strategic and theater issues including its partnership” with the Afghan government.<sup>107</sup> Establishing the IJC enabled a coherent and responsive feedback system that improved the synchronization of day-to-day operations, and integrated civil-military activities throughout Afghanistan. The IJC reinforced General McChrystal’s commonly understood intent and provided timely indicators upon which to base decisions.

*The design of physical space, facades, and buildings* is the next mechanism and in this case, General McChrystal sought austerity to reflect the operational focus of ISAF and reconfigured key areas to support ISAF’s increasingly networked structure. In terms of austerity, he banned alcohol and closed fast food outlets on major ISAF bases because he believed them to be a “distracter that changes the focus of the mission” and “supplying nonessential luxuries to big bases like Bagram and Kandahar makes it harder to get essential items to combat outposts

and forward operating bases.”<sup>108</sup> ISAF members had grown accustomed to these luxuries and their closure, while unpopular, reinforced ISAF’s focus.

Under General McChrystal’s leadership, the design of physical structures began to mirror his concept of ISAF’s networked organization. With promoting communication, understanding, and increasing the speed of decision-making as his goal, General McChrystal designed workspaces to reflect a cross-functional organization and collaborative processes. This made key actors more accessible through physical layout and communications capabilities. For example, through increased digital connectivity, he increased participation in daily updates from about thirty to 4000 people.<sup>109</sup> He personally oversaw the construction of a situational awareness room within which he and his key staff operated, received updates, and shared ideas. This significantly reduced decision-making time and increased overall efficiency. These changes to physical structures facilitated the faster transmission of information and reflected General McChrystal’s desire to flatten the organization’s structure to improve responsiveness and integrate key members of the staff to promote greater unity of effort.

The next mechanism relates to *the use of formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters*. The principle document used to convey ISAF’s organizational philosophy was the “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance.” This document contained General McChrystal’s vision and ISAF’s mission, why it was important and how, in general terms, it was to be accomplished. Ultimately, it served to provide the force with a “sense of purpose, direction, energy, and identity.”<sup>110</sup> Complementing this vision were General McChrystal’s “Eight Imperatives of COIN” which were simple and easy to understand tenets. These extended and reinforced his vision, standards, and expectations. Most importantly, the Counterinsurgency Guidance and the “Eight Imperatives of COIN” were intent-based that focused on outcomes.<sup>111</sup>

They avoided prescription, were trans-cultural, and did not conflict with any particular nation's approach. General McChrystal referred to his guidance frequently and repeated the imperatives constantly, amplifying them with metaphors and analogies. Ultimately, he measured the actions of the force against them.<sup>112</sup>

The final reinforcing mechanisms, *rites and rituals of the organization along with stories about important events and people*, focus on the importance of symbols. Due to ISAF's diversity, with each nation and organization having its own rites and rituals, and viewing symbols differently, these reinforcement mechanisms were difficult to use. However, General McChrystal did seek to penetrate cultural barriers by focusing on the essential elements of COIN, often employing storytelling that resonated across cultures as a means to reinforce effective COIN practices. He frequently highlighted Afghan perceptions of ISAF actions, and by doing this, reinforced the importance of understanding the operating environment and the types of actions that were required to be successful. This approach represents his realistic acknowledgment that fundamentally altering the culture of specific troop-contributing nations was impossible but that the way in which they conducted operations was subject to influence.

### **Did a Change in Operational Culture Improve ISAF's Effectiveness?**

*There is nothing wrong with change, if it is in the right direction.*<sup>113</sup>  
-- Winston Churchill (1943)

While there is little doubt General McChrystal changed ISAF's culture and improved unity, there is little merit in changing if the results of change do not equate to success. Did his efforts translate into increased operational effectiveness?

Operational culture is inherently qualitative and it is difficult to determine its impact on tactical action. However, there are indications that General McChrystal's efforts began to achieve their intended effects. Specifically, one of his key metrics was civilian casualties

attributable to ISAF action. Therefore, it can serve as an indicator as to whether a change in operational culture led to increased counterinsurgent effectiveness. During the first six months of 2010, civilian casualties caused by pro-government (ISAF and Afghan) forces were at an all time low of 12% compared to 24% a year before.<sup>114</sup> Similarly, during this same period, 69% of Afghans felt the Taliban represented the biggest danger to them while their perception of the danger posed by ISAF soldiers hit an all-time low of 4%.<sup>115</sup> After General McChrystal had been in Afghanistan for six months, in December 2009, 70% of Afghans believed things were going in the right direction, a number that stood in stark contrast to the 40% of Afghans who had similar feelings the year before.<sup>116</sup> While these statistics are general, they are also compelling. Civilian casualties decreased amidst an increase of ISAF soldiers and their action against insurgents. This indicates an increasingly discriminate use of force. At the same time, the increase of soldiers on the ground implies increased interaction with the population and the fact that Afghan perceptions of ISAF were improving suggests this interaction was positive. These trends represent the product of a number of factors, one of which it is reasonable to assert, was a change in operational culture.

From a qualitative perspective, the opinions of those serving in ISAF during General McChrystal's tenure as commander indicate that he changed the way ISAF thought, acted, and operated. Why? It is as simple as "they believe change occurred" – he was the leader, they were the led, and they experienced and felt the change.<sup>117</sup>

## Conclusion

*When you're facing a counterinsurgency war, if you get the strategy right, you can get the tactics wrong, and eventually you'll get the tactics right. If you get the strategy wrong and the tactics right at the start, you can refine the tactics forever, but you still lose the war.*<sup>118</sup>

-- Robert Killebrew (1972)

Military failures occur because organizations fail to learn, anticipate, or adapt.<sup>119</sup> In 2009, ISAF was on the brink of failure because it was failing to adapt. Unity of effort was absent. General McChrystal started to reverse this failure by changing and unifying the way ISAF thought, acted, and operated. His efforts yielded three fundamental lessons for those facing similar challenges.

First, General McChrystal's effort reinforces the importance of operational culture as a decisive dimension of COIN. Rather than confining his calculus to the *sine qua non* of the Western way of war, which is the identification and neutralization of targets through lethal force, he aptly identified operational culture as an essential factor in ISAF's success.<sup>120</sup> While embracing the Afghan population was essential for ISAF, General McChrystal took this COIN axiom a step further – he wanted Afghans to embrace ISAF. In doing this, he demonstrated the importance of understanding the culture of the populace whose support the counterinsurgent seeks. Furthermore, this highlights the requirement for the operational commander to view the operating environment holistically and to consider the impact of not only counterinsurgent actions but also their behavior and attitudes. By seeking changes that were *sufficient* to achieve the mission and *similar* enough to unify effort, General McChrystal's experience demonstrates that a common operational culture, when directly tied to mission success can exist within a coalition. Operational commanders must not view their own culture or the cultural of a multinational organization as fixed.

Next, General McChrystal's command of ISAF demonstrates the pivotal role an operational commander plays in changing the key elements of an organization's culture. He was the principle determinant in changing ISAF's mindset. Reinforcing his experience with resolve he led, managed, and thrived on change.<sup>121</sup> General McChrystal gained an understanding of the

situation, diagnosed the roots of ISAF's ineffectiveness, and sought the political and strategic clarity necessary to prosecute an effective campaign. Armed with that clarity, his actions focused the efforts of the force. Surrounding himself with a group of officers he knew and trusted, he led ISAF from the center, exerting influence "up, down, and across."

When viewed through Schien's model, it is clear General McChrystal embedded change that reflected the overarching strategy. He controlled kinetic actions, promoted interaction with Afghans, used crisis to reinforce his intent, personally played a key role in coaching COIN best practices, and allocated resources to enable the force to focus on the protection of the population. He reinforced these changes with a clear vision, and a consistent and transparent narrative that transcended the political, strategic, operational, and tactical domains. Furthermore, he designed structures and processes to enable decision-making and promote collaboration across the force – especially with key Afghan actors. The way he changed ISAF serves as a model for change in any situation.

General Stanley McChrystal led ISAF from its center. His position at the center of ISAF reflects the character of current conflict and the demands of contemporary operational command. In these wars "amongst the people," the volume and complexity of cognitive tension represent their distinguishing characteristics and requires a change in the way commanders exercise command. General McChrystal's experience shows that cognitive tension can be reduced by embracing the essence of mission command – building relationship and trust while adopting a collaborative approach to decision-making. Together these critical elements will promote a shared consciousness and unify effort. While the outcome of the Afghan campaign remains unknown, General McChrystal's command of ISAF serves as a case study in command in "wars amongst the people," which do not represent an aberration but the new epoch of warfare.

## Appendix A – General McChrystal's Assignment History<sup>122</sup>



Date	Assignment	Comd	Staff	PME	Remarks
Jun 72 Jun 76	Cadet, United States Military Academy			X	Commissioned into the U.S. Army as an Infantry Officer.
Nov 76 Feb 78	Weapons Platoon Leader, C Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	X			
Feb 78 Jul 78	Rifle Platoon Leader, C Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	X			
Jul 78 Nov 78	Executive Officer, C Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	X			
Nov 78 Apr 79	Student, Special Forces Officer Course, Special Forces School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina			X	This course provided General McChrystal with fundamental insights into the nature of insurgency from the guerrilla's perspective.
Apr 79 Jun 80	Commander, Detachment A, A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg,	X			

	North Carolina				
Jun 80 Feb 81	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia		X		
Feb 81 Mar 82	S2/S3 (Intelligence/Operations), United Nations Command Support Group Joint Security Area, Korea	X			
Mar 82 Nov 82	Training Officer, Directorate of Plans and Training, A Company, Headquarters Command, Fort Stewart, Georgia	X			
Nov 82 Sep 84	Commander, A Company, 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia	X			
Sep 85 Jan 86	Liaison Officer, 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia	X			
Jan 86 May 87	Commander, A Company, 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia	X			
Apr 88 Jun 89	S3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia	X			
Jun 89 Jun 90	Student, Command and Staff Course, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island		X		
Jun 90 Apr 93	Army Special Operations Action Officer, J3, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia	X			Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb who served with McChrystal at this time wrote, "I first worked for him in the gulf war, and General McChrystal was the sharpest, fastest staff officer I have ever come across — and I had been serving for 20 years at that point... He could take ideas, concepts, directions, and he could turn them into language, into understanding, and pass it out at an electric rate." <sup>123</sup>
Apr 93 Nov 94	Commander, 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	X			During this period, General McChrystal's unit lost 11 soldiers from his battalion in the Green Ramp incident at Fort Bragg. <sup>124</sup>
Nov 94 Jun 96	Commander, 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Lewis, Washington	X			
Jun 96 Jun 97	Senior Service College Fellowship, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts		X		During this period General McChrystal co-authored a paper entitled "Bridging the Competence Gap – Developing Tactical Leaders for the Army of 2015". This paper provides insight into his thinking at the time.

Jun 97 Aug 99	Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia	X			
Aug 99 Jun 00	Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York			X	
Jun 00 Jun 01	Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina to include duty as Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Kuwait, Camp Doha, Kuwait	X			
Jun 01 Jul 02	Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina to include duty as Chief of Staff, Combined Joint Task Force 180, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan		X		
Jul 02 Sep 03	Vice Director for Operations, J3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC		X		
Sep 03 Feb 06	Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	X			
Feb 06 Jun 08	Commander, Joint Special Operations Command/Commander, Joint Special Operations Command Forward, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	X			
Aug 08 Jun 09	Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC		X		
Jun 09 Jul 10	Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan	X			Succeeded by General David Petraeus as COMISAF.
July 23, 2010	Retires from the U.S. Army				

## **Appendix B – Chronology of General McChrystal’s Command of ISAF**

27 March 2009 – Following a policy review, President Obama announces new Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its central tenet was “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”<sup>125</sup> To achieve this effect, a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy would be resourced and executed.

3 – 4 April 2010 – A NATO summit on Afghanistan held in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany.

1 May 2009 – U.S. National Security Strategy is published.

11 May 2009 – Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announces General Stanley McChrystal has been nominated to replace General David McKiernan as the Commander of ISAF and United States Forces in Afghanistan.

13 June 2009 – General McChrystal issues his “Initial Guidance” to ISAF outlining what would become the “Eight Imperatives of COIN.”

15 June 2009 – General McChrystal officially assumes command of ISAF.

2 July 2009 – Operation Khanjar is launched in Helmand Province

6 July 2009 – General McChrystal issues a “Tactical Directive” outlining the mission and the general way in which the mission would be achieved.

25 August 2009 – General McChrystal issues his Counterinsurgency Guidance clearly articulating the ways in which ISAF would achieve its mission.

15 August 2009 – ISAF Headquarters is attacked by a suicide car bomb leaving 7 people dead and 91 people injured.

20 August 2009 – Afghan National Election held. This election remained unresolved due to allegations of voting fraud and a long period of vote counting. Voter turnout in this election was approximately 30% of Afghan citizens.

30 August 2009 – General McChrystal submits strategic assessment to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.

1 October 2009 – General McChrystal delivers a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He suggested that an increase in the number of soldiers were

required to successfully execute the counterinsurgency strategy. The White House was angered by this claim.

2 October 2009 – President Obama and General McChrystal meet aboard Air Force One in Copenhagen in the wake of McChrystal’s call for an increase in soldiers in Afghanistan.

2 November 2009 – President Karzai is declared the President of Afghanistan for another five-year term.

12 November 2009 – The ISAF Joint Command, responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of ISAF is established under the command of Lieutenant-General David Rodriguez.

21 November 2009 – The NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan is formed and paired with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan with the responsibility for training Afghan security forces.

1 December 2009 – After a series of policy review session based on General McChrystal’s assessment, President Obama delivers a speech on Afghanistan at the United States Military Academy. Following the speech, General McChrystal conveys to ISAF that they have the clarity, capability, commitment and confidence to successfully achieve the mission.<sup>126</sup>

8 December 2009 – General McChrystal testifies before Congress and provides an update on the situation in Afghanistan.

4 January 2010 – Major General Michael Flynn releases, through the Center New American Security, a critical examination of U.S. intelligence efforts in Afghanistan. Releasing such criticism through an independent think tank broke convention and generated significant discussion in military and political circles.

26 January 2010 – Mark Sedwill from Great Britain appointed as NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

23 June 2010 – President Obama accepts the resignation of General McChrystal in the wake of the article by Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General” in *Rolling Stone* magazine. This article portrayed General McChrystal and some of his staff in a negative light.

## Appendix C – Characterizing the Continuum of Command in ISAF

Strategy	General McKiernan June 3, 2008 to June 15, 2009	General McChrystal June 15, 2009 to June 23, 2010	General Petraeus July 4, 2010 to Present
ENDS	<b>NATO Objectives<sup>127</sup></b>	UN Resolution 1883 (September 23, 2008) calls upon NATO to disarm militias, reform the justice system, train a national police force and army, provide security for elections, and combat the narcotics industry.	
	<b>U.S. Objectives<sup>128</sup></b>	<p>As of 27 March 2009, U.S objectives in Afghanistan are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.</li> <li>• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.</li> <li>• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.</li> <li>• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.</li> <li>• Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.</li> </ul>	
WAYS	<b>Operational Approach</b>	Generally, population-centric COIN in title but enemy-centric in execution. There were instances of successful population centric COIN being implemented.	The approach transitioned from a “military heavy” enemy-centric approach to an increasingly comprehensive civil-military COIN approach.
	<b>ISAF Force Levels<sup>129</sup></b>	June 2008 – 52,900 June 2009 – 61,130	October 2009 – 85,795 June 2010 – 119,500
MEANS	<b>Afghan National Army Force Levels<sup>130</sup></b>	79,068 (2008)	100,131 (2009)
			144,638 (2010)


**Appendix D – “Level 5 Leadership – The Paradoxical Combination of Humility and Will”<sup>131</sup>**

**A Leadership Type Proposed by Jim Collins**

<b>A Summary of Level 5 Leadership</b>	
<b>Professional Will</b>	<b>Personal Humility</b>
Creates superb results, a clear catalyst in the transition from good to great.	Demonstrates a compelling modesty, shunning public adulation; never boastful.
Demonstrates an unwavering resolve to do whatever must be done to produce the best long-term results, no matter how difficult.	Acts with quiet, calm determination; relies principally on inspired standards, not inspiring charisma to motivate.
Sets the standards for building an enduring great company; will settle for nothing less.	Channels ambition into the company, not the self; sets up successors for even greater success in the next generation.
Looks in the mirror, not out the window, to apportion responsibility for poor results, never blaming other people, external factors or bad luck.	Looks out the window, not in the mirror, to apportion credit for the success of the company – to other people, external factors and good luck.


## Appendix E – Force Disposition and Troop Contributions by Nation<sup>132</sup>

June 2009




	Albania	140		Finland	90		Lithuania	200		Spain	780
	Australia	1090		France	2780		Luxemburg	9		Sweden	410
	Austria	3		Georgia	1		Netherlands	1770		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	170
	Azerbaijan	90		Germany	3380		New Zealand	170		Turkey	730
	Belgium	500		Greece	145		Norway	485		Ukraine	10
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2		Hungary	320		Poland	2000		United Arab Emirates	25
	Bulgaria	470		Iceland	8		Portugal	100		United Kingdom	8300
	Canada	2830		Ireland	7		Romania	875		United States	28950
	Croatia	290		Italy	2350		Singapore	7			
	Czech Republic	430		Jordan	7		Slovakia	230			
	Denmark	700		Latvia	165		Slovenia	70			
	Estonia	150								Total (rounded)	61130

June 2010



	Albania	250		Germany	4350		Poland	2500
	Armenia	75		Greece	75		Portugal	265
	Australia	1550		Hungary	340		Romania	1140
	Austria	3		Iceland	3		Singapore	40
	Azerbaijan	90		Ireland	7		Slovakia	290
	Belgium	590		Italy	3300		Slovenia	75
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	10		Jordan	6		Spain	1415
	Bulgaria	525		Republic of Korea	0		Sweden	500
	Canada	2830		Latvia	170		The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	210
	Croatia	280		Lithuania	245		Turkey	1710
	Czech Republic	525		Luxembourg	9		Ukraine	15
	Denmark	750		Mongolia	40		United Arab Emirates	25
	Estonia	160		Montenegro	30		United Kingdom	9500
	Finland	115		Netherlands	1705		United States	78430
	France	3750		New Zealand	155			
	Georgia	925		Norway	500		Total	119,500

## **Appendix F – Sources of Cognitive Tension**



## Glossary of Acronyms

## CIVCAS – Civilian Casualties

## CT – Counter-terrorism

#### EOF – Escalation of Force

FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)

HC = ISAF Joint Command

NTM - A - NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan

#### **ROE – Rules of Engagement**


RoE = Rules of Engagement  
WoG = Whole of Government

## Appendix G – Change of Operational Culture using Schein’s Model

Drivers of Change	Required Changes to Operational Culture	Embedding Mechanisms	Reinforcing Mechanisms
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>President Obama’s Inauguration</li> <li>Afghan Strategy Review</li> <li>Surge of Forces authorized by President Bush</li> <li>Appointment of General McChrystal as COMISAF</li> <li>Strategic Assessment</li> </ul>	<p>Change ISAF culture from one focused on the tactical defeat of insurgents to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus on protecting the Afghan people</li> <li>Gain a better understanding of the environment</li> <li>Build relationships with Afghans</li> </ul>	<p><b>What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Afghan desires</li> <li>CIVCAS</li> <li>EOF</li> <li>Tactical Driving</li> <li>Narrative</li> <li>Cultural understanding</li> <li>Communication across ISAF</li> </ul> <p><b>How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Opportunity to reinforce and realign intent</li> </ul> <p><b>Allocation of resources</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Designation of main and supporting efforts</li> <li>Integration of civil-military resources</li> </ul> <p><b>Deliberate role-modeling, teaching and coaching</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Battlefield circulation</li> <li>Eight Imperatives of COIN videos</li> <li>Use of widely distributed print media</li> </ul> <p><b>How leaders allocate rewards and status</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restraint, accepting risk to protect Afghans and gain information was rewarded.</li> </ul> <p><b>How leaders select, promote and excommunicate</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scrutiny of those U.S personnel occupying key positions</li> </ul>	<p><b>Organizational structure and design</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ISAF Joint Command HQ</li> </ul> <p><b>Organizational systems and procedures</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Feedback from tactical level informed operational decision-making</li> <li>Build a social network to promote constant cross communications</li> </ul> <p><b>The design of physical space, facades, and buildings</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Austerity to imbue focus</li> <li>Openness to foster communication</li> <li>Use of digital communications</li> </ul> <p><b>Use of formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Counterinsurgency Guidance</li> <li>Eight Imperatives of COIN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Repetition</li> <li>Simplicity</li> <li>Analogies and Metaphors</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>Rites and rituals of the organization</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not explicitly used</li> </ul> <p><b>Storytelling about important events and people</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reinforce Afghan confidence through the use of stories</li> <li>Reinforce ISAF actions by relaying Afghan stories using stories to highlight perceptions</li> </ul>

Appendix H – ISAF Upper Command Structure<sup>133</sup>


## ISAF Upper Command Structure



<sup>133</sup> Operational Monitoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Monitoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs)

<sup>134</sup> The civilian component of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs) is run by the ISAF nation leading the PRT

## Appendix I – ISAF Joint Command Structure<sup>134</sup>



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“The IJC, designed specifically around the requirements for this counterinsurgency fight, consists of four permanent Cross Functional Teams: the Information Dominance Center (IDC), Current Operations (CUOPS), Future Operations (FUOPS) and Future Plans (FUPLANS). The CUOPS focuses on the 0 – 96 hours horizon; FUOPS CFT’s planning horizon is 72 hours – 60 days, and FUPLANS focuses beyond 60 days. The Information Dominance Center encompasses all these time horizons so that all teams are saturated in knowledge and a situational understanding. The four CFTs promote a significantly higher degree of continuous collaboration and information exchange to plan, execute and assess operational events than would temporary teams, working groups, and operational planning teams typical of two-, three- and four-star level headquarters.”<sup>135</sup>

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Abraham Lincoln as cited in James Stavridis, *Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command* (Washington: NDU Press, November 2010), 23.

<sup>2</sup> This characterization of COIN was made by Gian Gentile. Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population Centric COIN and the Army,” *Parameters*, Autumn 2009, 5-17.

<sup>3</sup> Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, telephone conversation with author, January 28, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Operational command “refers to activities within a single theater of war. It is the act of leading a large and complex...joint forces command in accomplishing political and military strategic objective assigned by the national or coalition leadership through the direct application of armed force. The essence of operational command is to make decisions on how to act effectively with feasibility”. Bruce Elleman and John Hattendorf, *Nineteen-Gun Salute* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2009), 245.

<sup>5</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, interview with the author, February 22, 2011. General McChrystal noted that contemporary command is characterized by leading from the center of an organization. This approach is in contrast to leading from the front or the rear, neither of which are effective in the decentralized, multi-faceted arena of operational command in COIN.

<sup>6</sup> The basis for “unprecedented” is simple: while forces have adapted amidst conflict for the past 5000 years, there has never been a counter-insurgency campaign involving as many nations as those within ISAF during which a fundamental change in approach, reflecting organizational culture, has been required.

<sup>7</sup> Ibn Qutayba, a notable 9th Century Islamic scholar, in the “Circle of Justice” (daira-yi ‘idalat) as cited in NATO, *Afghanistan Report 2009*, (Brussels: NATO, 2009), 18.

<sup>8</sup> Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, and Michael O’Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post 9-11 Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, December 31, 2010), 17. In this survey, 26% of the population was sympathetic to the insurgents, 7% openly supported the insurgents and only 19% of Afghans were sympathetic towards the government. Interestingly, 41% of the population remained neutral.

<sup>9</sup> David Kilcullen notes there is a dichotomy between intervention and domestic counterinsurgency, two classifications of COIN that are distinct. David Kilcullen, “Intelligence,” *Understanding Counterinsurgency*, eds. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney. (Routledge: New York: 2010), 145.

<sup>10</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, interview with author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> This quotation is attributed to General David Petraeus.

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<sup>12</sup> David Kilcullen as cited in, Robert Blackwill, “Plan B in Afghanistan. Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option”, *Foreign Affairs*, January–February 2011, 43.

<sup>13</sup> Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 164.

<sup>14</sup> The subject of troop density in COIN is the subject of considerable debate within academic and military circles. Steven Goode notes three drivers as determinants of force levels: “First, as previous studies have argued and current doctrine emphasizes, security forces have to be sized relative to the population. Second, the more intense the insurgency, the more forces are required to reverse increasing insurgent violence. Third, the larger the percentage of personnel that are drawn from the host nation, the fewer forces will be needed overall.” See Steven Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency”, *Parameters*, Winter 2009 – 2010, 45-46. US Army/USMC COIN doctrine loosely quantifies requirements based on history stating: “[N]o predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in (counterinsurgency) . . . A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents in an [area of operations]. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective [counterinsurgency] operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent on the situation.” See U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*. Field Manual 3-24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-13.

<sup>15</sup> H.R. McMaster, “NATO will only succeed when its platoons succeed: psychological and ethical preparation for counterinsurgency operations” *Complex Operations: NATO at War and in the margins of war* – NDC Forum Paper 14, ed. Christopher M. Schnaubelt (Rome: National Defense College, July 2010), 71.

<sup>16</sup> Anthony Cordesman and Jason Lemieux, *The Afghan Campaign: An Overview* (Washington, DC: Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 23, 2010), 17. Of interest in this assessment is the fact that when ISAF soldiers were perceived to be the cause of CIVCAS, violent activities within the area affected by the incident increased by 25 to 65 percent for five months following. When insurgents caused CIVCAS, violent activities increased in the area in which the casualties occurred by 10% to 25% for three months following. This highlights the impact of civilian casualties but also the reality that the actions of the insurgents did not have the negative impact of those caused by ISAF.

<sup>17</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, U.S. Army, *Commander’s Initial Assessment* (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, 30 August 2009), 1-1.

<sup>18</sup> David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 51.

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<sup>19</sup>T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997), 14.

<sup>20</sup> Stephen Gerras and Leonard Wong, “Organizational Culture: Applying a Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army,” (manuscript, United States Army War College, November 2008), 2.

<sup>21</sup> Walter F. Ulmer, et al. *American Military Culture in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2001), xv. See also Martin van Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York: Random House, 2008). van Creveld notes that war is cultural rather than natural.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, Field Manual 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 26, 2010), 1-5.

<sup>23</sup> Paula Holmes-Eber and Barak Salmoni, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* (Quantico: Marine Corps University, 2008), 44. In seeking to articulate the true realm of *operational culture* it is necessary to distinguish the difference between *operational culture* and *climate*: “Culture is a longer lasting and more complex set of shared expectations than climate. While climate is a reflection about how people think and feel about their organization right now, culture consists of the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution over time. It is deeply rooted in long-held beliefs, customs, and practices. Leaders must establish a climate consistent with the culture of the enduring institution. They also use the culture to let their people know they are part of something bigger than just themselves, that they have responsibilities not only to the people around them but also to those who have gone before and those who will come after.” This distinction is made in U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Field Manual 6-22, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, October, 2006), 8-1.

<sup>24</sup> The idea of sufficiency and similarity is adapted from: Kathleen Sutcliffe and Karl Weick, *Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in the Age of Uncertainty* (San Francisco: Wiley), 112.

<sup>25</sup> “Moral fog” is a term used by David Galula to highlight the difficulties in understanding a culturally asymmetric environment. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* Praeger: Westport, 1964), 49.

<sup>26</sup> Montgomery McFate, “Culture” *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges*, eds. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 2010), 194. McFate specifically examines the correlation between cultural knowledge and the reduction of casualties.

<sup>27</sup> David Kilcullen as quoted in U.S. Department of Defense, *Counterinsurgency*, Joint Publication 3-24, (Department of Defense, Washington, DC: October 5, 2009), IV-I.

<sup>28</sup> This is the Stockdale Group definition of *operational leadership*. This definition was developed during a directed elective at the Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare, 2007. The definition was subsequently promulgated and validated through 107 survey responses

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from flag and general officers. This definition was cited in Christopher D. Hayes, “Developing the Navy’s Operational Leaders: A Critical Analysis” *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3, (Summer 2008), 78.

<sup>29</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport: Praeger, 1964), 61.

<sup>30</sup> Cognitive tension “is the universal dynamism that results from the inevitable tension between the tactical objective which orients (on) fighting formations at any level, and the operational or strategic aim, which directs the military system as a whole.” Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (Portland: Cummings Center, 1997), 65.

<sup>31</sup> In a comprehensive examination of multiple sources to determine the tasks facing an operational commander in COIN, these unique command functions were identified. These include translating and balancing strategic guidance with the desires of the host-nation’s government; maintaining key relations with leaders from the supported government, civilian leaders, representatives from other organizations and agencies; managing the campaign narrative and communicating strategically to the indigenous population and members of the alliance or coalition; informing diplomatic efforts and initiatives and overseeing and guiding efforts in detention facilities.

<sup>32</sup> Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 5. Moyar notes, “Historically, commanders prescriptively conveyed their intent by listing restrictions and then, within the confines of those restrictions, local commanders decided how to accomplish their mission.”

<sup>33</sup> Generally, for the operational commander, issues surrounding the allocation of resources and application of combat power represent the confines of their decision-making authority.

<sup>34</sup> Multi-national Force Commander (MNFC) “is a general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the MNFC’s command authority is determined by the participating nations. This authority could range in degree from command, to directing support relationships, to being the coordinating authority between the various nations, as discussed in paragraph 2 above. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. MNFCs unify the efforts of the MNF toward common objectives. Gaining consensus is an important aspect of decision making in multinational operations.” *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-16, II-6. Tied to gaining consensus are the four tenets of multinational operations: respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience. *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-16, I-9 – I-10.

<sup>35</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-22. U.S. Department of Defense, *Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, defines unity of effort as the “coordination and cooperation among all military forces and other organizations toward a commonly recognized objective, even if the forces and nonmilitary organizations are not

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necessarily part of the same command structure.” U.S. Department of the Army, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. Field Manual 6-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 2003), 2-7.

<sup>36</sup> LtCol Michael Canna, USAF, *Command and Control of Multinational Operations Involving U.S. Military Forces* (Occasional Paper, Atlantic Council, 2004), 8. On the subject of coalition warfare and unifying effort it is important to consider history. General Eisenhower, often considered the master of Alliance and Coalition Warfare, provides context for the challenges of unifying effort, in words that resonate with those facing the challenge of creating unity in Afghanistan: “Alliances in the past have often done no more than to name the common foe, and ‘unity of command’ has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a command of different nationality or different service. . . . I was determined, from the first, to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.” Quoted in Forest Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 45.

<sup>37</sup> Christopher Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, “Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan”, *Strategic Forum*, October 2009, 2.

<sup>38</sup> Anthony Cordesman and Jason Lemieux, *The Afghan Campaign: An Overview* (Washington, DC: Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 23, 2010), 16.

<sup>39</sup> Suzanne Koelbl, “German Forces in Afghanistan Let Taliban Commander Escape.” *Spiegel Online International* <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,554033,00.html> (accessed March 28, 2011).

<sup>40</sup> In considering the diverse make-up of ISAF, this is an important point. Peter Rosen contends “military organizations are shaped by internal conditions of their country of origin.” See: Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters” *International Security* Vol. 19 no. 4 (Spring 1995), 5.

<sup>41</sup> The term coalition is important. While NATO is a strategic alliance, ISAF represents a coalition because of the ad hoc arrangements that are prevalent in the employment of forces. The ad hoc nature of a coalition distinguishes from an alliance. An alliance “is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members.” In contrast, a coalition “is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.” US Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 5, 2000), GL-4.

<sup>42</sup> H.R. McMaster, “Centralization vs. Decentralization: Preparing for and Practicing Mission Command in Counterinsurgency Operations”, *Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields*, Thomas Donnelly and Frederick Kagan, eds. (Washington DC: AEI Press, 2010), 69.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid. Related to decentralization is the concept of irreversibility. David Galula writes, "...the counterinsurgent introduces some measure of irreversibility in his operations. When troops live among the population and give it protection until the population is able to protect itself with a minimum of outside support, the insurgent's power cannot easily be rebuilt..." Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 57.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-26.

<sup>45</sup> Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command*, 6. Moyar notes, "regardless of how brilliant or dynamic national or intermediate leaders are, they do not achieve success in the counterinsurgency when local leaders are devoid of leadership abilities."

<sup>46</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, U.S. Army, *ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance* (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, 3 July 2009), 3.

<sup>47</sup> Bruce Elleman and John Hattendorf, *Nineteen-Gun Salute* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2009), 246.

<sup>48</sup> John Keegan posits that "mystification" is a product of the physical or social distance established between the commander and his subordinates. John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (New York: Penguin, 1987), 315 – 317. In the case of General McChrystal, this distance was born out of the reality that he was more focused, ascetic, and stoic than most, if not all of his subordinates and was further amplified by his success as the commander of JSOC.

<sup>49</sup> Jim Collins has written extensively about leadership and highlights the importance of two hallmarks of General McChrystal's leadership – humility and resolve. Collins writes, "It is very important to grasp that Level 5 leadership is not just about humility and modesty. It is equally about ferocious resolve, an almost stoic determination to do whatever needs to be done..." Jim Collins, *Good to Great* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 30.

<sup>50</sup> "Transformational leadership" is seen when leaders, "stimulate interest in colleagues and followers to view their work from new perspectives; generate awareness of the mission or vision of the team and organization; develop colleagues and followers to higher levels of ability and potential; and motivate colleagues and followers to look beyond their own interests toward those that will benefit the group." Bruce Avolio and Bernard Bass (eds.), *Improving Organizational Effectiveness Through Transformational Leadership*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 2.

<sup>51</sup> The role of a leader as a "catalyst" is reinforced in Rod A. Beckstrom and Ori Brafman, *Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 76 – 98. Catalysts are inspirational and collaborative and seek to create a powerful network (team), by empowering people and getting out of the way. Specific attributes of a catalyst include a genuine interest in others; they maintain a high number of acquaintances; they relate individuals to their social network; they seek to help others; they have passion; they meet people where they are; they have a high degree of emotional intelligence; they are inspired by goals; they inherently trust people; they have a high tolerance for ambiguity; they adopt a

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hands off approach; and, they recede into the background after establishing well-functioning teams. Although General McChrystal was actively engaged in every aspect of his command, his approach and attributes are congruent to those of a catalyst.

<sup>52</sup> “Adaptive leadership is a set of strategies and practices that can help organizations and the people in them break through gridlocks, accomplish change, and develop the adaptability to thrive in complex, competitive, and challenging environments. It differs from many leadership perspectives in its core premise that one can learn good leadership. Yet, in hierarchical institutions like the military, enabling creative decision making and encouraging young leaders to challenge assumption can prove difficult. The sheer quantity of issues and the uncertain nature of our current threat environment requires innovative thinkers who can manage and lead adaptively.” Paula Broadwell, “Leadership, Petraeus Style.” *Boston.com*, April 21, 2009. [http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial\\_opinion/oped/articles/2009/04/21/leadership\\_petraeus\\_style/](http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/04/21/leadership_petraeus_style/) (accessed January 11, 2011).

<sup>53</sup> An example of General McChrystal’s “personal touch” was the fact that he wrote over 2500 personal letters to soldiers and their families while he was COMISAF. This included letters to the families of each ISAF soldier who was killed. In terms of trust, General McChrystal sought to establish and create trust rapidly so as to improve relationships and decision-making. General Stanley McChrystal, interview with the author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>54</sup> The importance of personality in coalition operations cannot be understated. Gal Luft reinforces the importance of the personality of the commander in his study of culture in coalition warfare. Gal Luft, *Beer, Bacon and Bullets: Culture in Coalition Warfare from Gallipoli to Iraq* (Amalfi Press, 2009), XXII.

<sup>55</sup> J.F.C Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, quoted in Peter Tsouras, *The Book of Military Quotations* (St Paul: Zenith, 2006), 67.

<sup>56</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, interview with author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>57</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, email to author, March 7, 2011.

<sup>58</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, email to author, March 7, 2011.

<sup>59</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, email to author, March 7, 2011.

<sup>60</sup> “A strategic paradox exists when an ostensibly militarily superior power confronts a seemingly inferior opponent because the superior power has unlimited means but generally has limited aims.” Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Westport: Praeger, 2006), 11.

<sup>61</sup> McChrystal, *Commander’s Initial Assessment*, i.

<sup>62</sup> David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 52.

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<sup>63</sup> Colin Gray examines in depth the perspectives on the relationship between strategy and tactics. While it is generally accepted that a superior strategy can withstand poor tactics, in the domain of counter-insurgency this is not the case. Specifically, Gray characterizes tactics not only as military action but as the behavior of soldiers, a particularly insightful and relevant observation in the domain of counter-insurgency. For Gray's insights on the relationships between strategy and tactics see Colin Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), 197. For Gray's characterization of behavior as an element of tactics, see p. 18.

<sup>64</sup> While there were not any specified assumptions, there seemed to be an acknowledgment that Afghanistan represented a “non-zero sum game.” More specifically, some conditions in Afghanistan were intractable and “achieving an imperfect but acceptable outcome” represented success. See Patrick J. Mahaney, “Observations for Practitioners of Complex Operations”, *Complex Operations: NATO at war and on the margins of war*, (Rome: NATO Defence College, July 2010), 50. Colin Gray in a broader sense reinforces this perspective and identifies as one of his forty maxims on war, peace and strategy, “The Impossible is Impossible; It is a Condition, Not a Problem for Which a Solution Has Yet to be Found”. Colin Gray, *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy* (Westport: Praeger, 2007), 86.

<sup>65</sup>Led by U.S. Army Colonel Christopher Kolenda, these experts included Dr Stephen Biddle, Paula Broadwell, Dr Anthony Cordesman, Catherine Dale (Congressional Research Service), Dr Sarah Chayes, Etienne du Durand (French Foreign Relations Institute), Andrew Exum (Center for New American Security), Frederick Kagan (American Enterprise Institute), Kimberly Kagan (Institute for the Study of War), Whitney Kassel (Office of the Secretary of Defense), Terry Kelly (RAND), Jeremy Shapiro (Brookings Institute), and Luis Peral (European Institute for Strategic Studies).

<sup>66</sup> McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*, 1-1.

<sup>67</sup> McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*, 1-1.

<sup>68</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, interview with author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>69</sup> The ISAF mission statement was: “ISAF, in support of the GIRoA, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.” Stanley McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*, 2-1. In terms of culture, Edgar Schien notes “cultures basically spring from three sources: (1) the beliefs, values and assumptions of the founders of organizations; (2) the learning experiences of group members as their organizations evolves; and (3) new beliefs, values, and assumptions brought in by new members and new leaders. Edgar Schien, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 4<sup>th</sup> ed (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 219.

<sup>70</sup> Stanley McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*, 2-1. While this shift did not preclude the tactical defeat of insurgents, the shift toward protecting the population meant that the

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insurgents would be fighting on ISAF's terms. On this topic, David Kilcullen provides interesting insights on the realities of the population-centric approach to COIN. "Again, in practice, this population-centric approach often involves as much fighting, if not more, than an enemy-centric approach, because putting in place effective population protection forces the enemy to come to us, so that we fight the guerrilla on our terms, not theirs. See: David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 51.

<sup>71</sup> Amplifying the requirement for this change, General McChrystal characterized ISAF's collective mindset in general terms: "A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador's cape – only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent." He further determined, "We will not win simply by killing insurgents. We will help the Afghan people win by securing them, by protecting them from intimidation, violence, and abuse, and by operating in a way that respects their culture and religion." Stanley McChrystal, *ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance* (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, 3 July 2009), 1-2.

<sup>72</sup> Schein's model has been challenged by social scientists who have observed that most organizations reflect great differentiation of views and multiple subcultures that obstruct or dilute the homogenization of common assumptions and beliefs. While such warning is relevant to any study of a coalition or alliance, it must be reinforced that General McChrystal did not seek a common organizational culture but rather an operational culture that was founded upon the best practices of population-centric approach to COIN. Conversely, in outlining the behavior that needed to change, he did not advocate a culture that broke any one organization or country's organizational culture. For counter arguments to Schien's model see Jesper S. Pederson and Jesper S. Sorenson, *Organizational Cultures in Theory and Practice* (Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing Company, 1989), 7; and also Donna Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations" *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 35, no. 3 (August 1998), 346-65.

<sup>73</sup> Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 1-2.

<sup>74</sup> Schien, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed, 235-257.

<sup>75</sup> Gerras and Wong, "Organizational Culture," 17.

<sup>76</sup> Stanley McChrystal, "Interview with General Stanley McChrystal", by Charlie Rose, *The Charlie Rose Show*, June 23, 2010. In this interview, McChrystal commented, "the difference between good units and great units is expectations".

<sup>77</sup> The attributes listed are mentioned in John Kotter and Dan Cohen, *The Heart of Change* (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2002), 4.

<sup>78</sup> "Not doing anything that someone else is capable of" seems to be a recurring practice amongst successful senior military leaders.

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<sup>79</sup>Stanley McChrystal, “Interview with General Stanley McChrystal”, by David Martin, *60 Minutes*, CBS, September 27, 2009. During this interview General McChrystal also commented, “We could do a lot of good things in Afghanistan for the next hundred years and fail because it just doesn’t add up to success.” These comments provide a sense of how success was being measured.

<sup>80</sup>This is the doctrinal approach espoused by the United States Marine Corps. As an approach, it is a “...dynamic view of command and control which sees command as the exercise of authority and control as feedback about the effects of the action taken. The commander commands by deciding what needs to be done and by directing or influencing the conduct of others. Control takes the form of feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning to the commander—which allows the commander to adjust and modify command action as needed. Feedback indicates the difference between the goals and the situation as it exists. Feedback may come from any direction and in any form—intelligence about how the enemy is reacting, information about the status of subordinate or adjacent units, or revised guidance from above based on developments. Feedback is the mechanism that allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances—to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing problems, modify schemes, or redirect efforts. In this way, feedback “controls” subsequent command action. In such a command and control system, control is not strictly something that seniors impose on subordinates; rather, the entire system comes “under control” based on feedback about the changing situation.” Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Command and Control*, MCDP 6, (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, October 4, 1996), 40.

<sup>81</sup> Stanley McChrystal, “Plywood Leadership,” Presentation given at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, September 30, 2010. McChrystal also conveyed the importance of decentralizing and seeking feedback during an earlier *60 Minutes* interview stating: “You can listen to every radio transmission down to squad level, and you can watch from the Predator and you can see what is going on but you can’t kid yourself that you know what is going on. But there is a danger that you do because you hear it and you see and you think, O.K. but you are not on the ground with that guy, you don’t feel it, you don’t hear the bullets, you just can’t make an assessment.” Stanley McChrystal, “Interview with General Stanley McChrystal”, by David Martin, *60 Minutes*, CBS, September 27, 2009.

<sup>82</sup> Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 52.

<sup>83</sup> Stanley McChrystal, “Comments made during Daily Commander’s Update Assessment”, Kabul: ISAF Headquarters, April, 2010. These comments were cited in Joseph Felter, “COIN Advisory and Assistance Team and COIN in Afghanistan,” Briefing at the U.S. Army and USMC Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, May 13, 2010.

<sup>84</sup> The issue of CIVCAS serves as a strong indicator as to the degree change was felt and accepted throughout the force. In a review of Marine Corps Lessons Learned reports from the period in which McChrystal was in command, it is evident that there was a clear understanding of his intent. For example, Colonel Killion, the G3 of MEB-A wrote, “There’s got to be a CIVCAS theme that goes through every aspect of planning and operations we do.” See: Colonel

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Michael P. Killion, USMC, G-3, MEB-A, interview with Major Lynn Wisehart, USMC, MCCLL, 7 April 2010 cited in MCCLL, "Civilian Casualty Mitigation: Summary of Lessons, Observations and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures from Marine Expeditionary Brigade – Afghanistan (MEB-A) January – April 2010", *MCCLL Quick Look Report*, (Quantico: MCCLL, July 29, 2010), 2. The importance of CIVCAS was also acknowledged by the United States Air Force which produced a similar report in September 2010. A document in this report illustrates the degree to which General McChrystal was effective in conveying his intent and ultimately changing culture. In this document, the Commander of the 455<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Operations Group asked his subordinates to ask themselves the following questions when considering the use of air munitions: "Can I employ legally?... Should I employ? Would Gen[eral] McChrystal employ?...Would an Afghan political leader employ?...Would the local village elder neutral to the coalition employ?" Colonel Patrick T. McKenzie, "Update to COMISAF Guidance on CIVCAS", April 7, 2010 as cited in USAF A9A, *USAF Comprehensive Civilian Casualty Study*, (Washington D.C.: Air Force Analyses and Assessments (HQ USAF/A9A), September 20, 2010), 20. For U.S. Army perspectives surrounding the issue of Escalation of Force, see Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Escalation of Force", *CALL Handbook 10-11*, (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 2009).

<sup>85</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, interview with author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>86</sup> Walter Pincus, "McChrystal Says Insurgents Are Winning Communications Battle", *Washington Post*, September 27, 2009, A14. The narrative in the Afghanistan campaign is multifaceted and has numerous audiences, possessing a variety of cultural perspectives. As an example, General McChrystal was very concerned about the information getting to senior U.S. decision-makers and sought increased transparency in this regard. "Our senior leaders – the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States – are not getting the right information to make decisions with. We must get this right. The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers." See: Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, January 2010), 4. Additionally, General McChrystal broke conventional wisdom in two ways: in communicating, he chose not to highlight the harm caused by the insurgents (so as not to bolster their perceived effectiveness) and he also announced upcoming operations in an effort to achieve greater transparency with the Afghan government and the country's population.

<sup>87</sup> On this subject, General McChrystal adopted a very utilitarian perspective that should not be interpreted as indicative of a lack of concern for ISAF or Afghan soldiers. In an interview with a British newspaper he stated: "In the long run it is more economical in terms of loss of life to operate this way because we can gain the support of the population." Chris Irvine, "Troop deaths are a risk worth paying, says Nato leader in Afghanistan," *Daily Telegraph*, July 9, 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/5782198/Troop-deaths-are-a-risk-worth-paying-says-Nato-leader-in-Afghanistan.html> (accessed 8 January 2011). In a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) interview in December 2009 he acknowledged the moral dimension of accepting this risk when asked the question "what do you worry about?" In response he stated, "I worry about our forces. I am responsible for a tremendous number of

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coalition forces. I am responsible to their families and their comrades for the well-being of each. By definition, my responsibility means I have to put them in harm's way. And to be as effective as I would like to be I have to bring them home safe. That is what I think about." Stanley McChrystal, "Interview with General Stanley McChrystal," by Susan Ormiston, CBC *National News*, December 16, 2009.

<sup>88</sup> Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General," *Rolling Stone*, July 8-22, 2010, p. 97.

<sup>89</sup> McChrystal's response was: "I'm saddened by the accusation that I don't care about soldiers, as it is something I suspect any soldier takes both personally and professionally – at least I do. But I know perceptions depend upon your perspective at the time, and I respect that every soldier's view is his own." McChrystal's actions reverberated throughout Regional Command South and sent a message that he cared but that reducing casualties and damage to civilian property was essential. Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General," *Rolling Stone*, July 8-22, 2010, 97.

<sup>90</sup> James Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency* (Minneapolis: Zenith, 2008), 26.

<sup>91</sup> Napoleon's Maxims quoted in T.R. Philips (ed.), *Roots of Strategy* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), 235.

<sup>92</sup> For a discussion on the importance of reporting culture see Sutcliffe and Weick, *Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in the Age of Uncertainty*, 129 - 131.

<sup>93</sup> Stanley McChrystal, "Comments made during daily Commander's Update Assessment", Kabul: ISAF Headquarters, April 13, 2010. These were cited in Joseph Felter, "COIN Advisory and Assistance Team and COIN in Afghanistan", Briefing at the U.S. Army and USMC Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, May 13, 2010. CIVCAS was clearly the predominant area in which General McChrystal sought to control. He issued "Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 373, Direction and Guidance on Escalation of Force." This comprehensive SOP was based on the following guiding principles which were clearly aligned in the values that underpinned his desired operational culture for ISAF: a reasonable effort should be made to control a situation without force; value each life and respect the population through all phases of your mission; involve the ANSF and local leadership in tailoring your tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP's) to the local environment; and if an occurs, take responsibility. See: Stanley McChrystal, *Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 373, Direction and Guidance on Escalation of Force* (Kabul: ISAF Headquarters, April 19, 2010), 2.

<sup>94</sup> McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment*, 2-2.

<sup>95</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, interview with author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>96</sup> Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, telephone conversation with author, January 28, 2011. General McChrystal was also careful not to immediately travel to a "point of crisis" to ensure he did not undermine the credibility of the commander directly involved in the situation.

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<sup>97</sup> Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, telephone conversation with author, January 28, 2011. This approach highlights the reality that in many ways, COIN is a “strategy of tactics” and that operational commanders must confirm and reinforce their intent at the lowest tactical level.

<sup>98</sup> These eight imperatives were derived from overarching COIN Guidance and included Protect and Partner with the People; Conduct a Comprehensive COIN Campaign; Understand the Environment; Ensure Values underpin our Effort; Listen Closely – Speak Clearly; Act as One Team; Constantly Adapt; and Act with Courage and Resolve.

<sup>99</sup> General McChrystal explained each of his imperatives of COIN in a series of eight videos which were uploaded to YouTube. An example of these videos is Stanley McChrystal, “Understand the Environment” *ISAF YouTube* can be found at:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgBRc7IIE0&feature=related> (accessed January 11, 2011). While the initial video had over 4500 views, the “views” of each of the specific imperative videos ranged from over 500 “views” to over 1600 “views”. The real value of these videos was for those preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. As an example of the articles used to reinforce COIN best practices, see Stanley McChrystal, “Be COIN Mindful, Always”, *COIN Common Sense* Volume 1, Issue 1, 2. Also a more generic example: Stanley McChrystal, “Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance”, *ISAF Mirror* Issue 55, 3. They were also published in multiple US Army publications, some of which are distributed widely to an international audience. For example, see Stanley A. McChrystal, “Eight Imperatives for Success in Afghanistan,” *Military Review*, Volume LXXXIX July – August 2009 No. 4, page 136.

<sup>100</sup> Stanley McChrystal, *COMUSFOR-/COMISAF Counterinsurgency Training Guidance* Kabul: ISAF Headquarters, November 10, 2009.

<sup>101</sup> Gary Griffin, *The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command*, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, July 1991), 1. Griffin notes, “One of the more fixed elements of command is what historian Martin van Creveld has called the ‘directed telescope.’ Van Creveld asserts that from ‘Plato to NATO,’ command in combat has consisted of a search for certainty more than anything else.” He goes on to describe, “The directed telescope or, more specifically, the use of specially selected, highly qualified, and trusted young officers as special agents or observers for the commander has been a fundamental method of responding to this persistent challenge.” While historically, the use of individuals was informal, the COIN Advisory and Assistance Team represents a formal organization employed as a “directed telescope”.

<sup>102</sup> Joseph Felter, “COIN Advisory and Assistance Team and COIN in Afghanistan”, Briefing at the U.S. Army and USMC Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, May 13, 2010.

<sup>103</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, interview with author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>104</sup> Mark Mandeles, “Imposing Order on Chaos: Establishing JTF Headquarters”, *Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal*, (Summer 2010), 26.

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<sup>105</sup> Stanley McChrystal, “It Takes a Network” *Foreign Policy* (March – April 2011), 67. In this article, General McChrystal outlines his approach to organizing COIN forces: “We had to figure out a way to retain our traditional capabilities of professionalism, technology, and, when needed, overwhelming force, while achieving levels of knowledge, speed, precision, and unity of effort that only a network could provide. We needed to orchestrate a nuanced, population-centric campaign that comprised the ability to almost instantaneously swing a devastating hammer blow against an infiltrating insurgent force or wield a deft scalpel to capture or kill an enemy leader.”

<sup>106</sup> McChrystal, “It Takes a Network,” 69.

<sup>107</sup> Mark Mandeles, “Imposing Order on Chaos: Establishing JTF Headquarters,” 21.

<sup>108</sup> Michael Hall, “Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Facilities,” ISAF Commander’s Blog, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/the-afghan-hands-blog/commanders-blog/command-sgt.-maj.-michael-t.-hall-morale-welfare-and-recreation-mwr-facilities.html> (accessed January 14, 2011).

<sup>109</sup> “Rolling Stone fact checker sent McChrystal aide 30 questions”, *Washington Post*, June 25, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062504194.html> (accessed January 14, 2011).

<sup>110</sup> Stephen Shambach, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Carlisle, PA.: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 47.

<sup>111</sup> General Stanley McChrystal and Sergeant-Major Hall, interview with author, February 22, 2011.

<sup>112</sup> In terms of communicating, repeating simple principles, using analogies and metaphors and simplicity are among the essential principles in articulating vision and intent. These principles were deemed to be critical by both General McChrystal, and communications and leadership experts. For example, see John Kotter: *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press), 90. General McChrystal affirmed this stating, “One of the things I learned about communications is you need to keep it very direct, very straightforward, simple, and you need to be repetitive with it. People need to hear a consistency in your message over time. Don’t worry about trying to say something dramatically different every time you talk to people because if they hear the same message enough times it’s actually very reassuring that you are consistent in the direction you’re trying to take the organization.” See: Lewis Lapham, <http://www.pacificfreepress.com/news/1/7572-messiahs-come-to-redeem-our-country-not-govern-it.html> December 12 2010 (accessed February 11, 2011)

<sup>113</sup> Winston Churchill “Winston Churchill Quotes” [http://thinkexist.com/quotation/there\\_is\\_nothing\\_wrong\\_with\\_change\\_if\\_it\\_is\\_in/179038.html](http://thinkexist.com/quotation/there_is_nothing_wrong_with_change_if_it_is_in/) (accessed March 3, 2011)

<sup>114</sup> Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, and Michael O’Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post 9-11 Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, December 31, 2010), 15.

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<sup>115</sup> Livingston, Messera, and O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index Tracking*, 37.

<sup>116</sup> Livingston, Messera, and O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index Tracking*, 35.

<sup>117</sup> This statement is made based on countless informal conversations with those who served under General McChrystal, either directly or indirectly.

<sup>118</sup> Colonel Robert Killbrew, quoted in Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 195.

<sup>119</sup> Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortune: Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 26.

<sup>120</sup> McFate, "Culture" *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges*, 192.

<sup>121</sup> The idea of managing, leading, and thriving on change is adapted from Mark Grandstaff, and Georgia Sorenson, eds. *Strategic Leadership: The General's Art* (Vienna, Virginia: Management Concepts, 2009), 271.

<sup>122</sup> <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/biography-general-stanley-mcchrystal/p19396> (accessed January 3, 2011)

<sup>123</sup> Dexter Filkins, "Stanley McChrystal's Long War," *New York Times Magazine* October 14, 2009, 16.

<sup>124</sup> Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, *Disaster on Green Ramp* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1996). General McChrystal's response to this incident is indicative of two traits that he exhibited throughout his career: compassion and focus.

<sup>125</sup> The White House, *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan* (Washington, DC: March 27, 2009), 1.

<sup>126</sup> Jim Garamone, "McChrystal Says Pieces in Place for Success," *Armed Forces Press Service*, December 8, 2009, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57008> (accessed December 31, 2010)

<sup>127</sup> Vincent Morelli, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance* CRS Report for Congress RL33627 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2009.), 9.

<sup>128</sup> The White House, *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report*, 1.

<sup>129</sup> These figures were obtained from <http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html> (accessed January 6, 2011)

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<sup>130</sup> These figures were obtained from Livingston, Messera, and O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security*, 6.

<sup>131</sup> Jim Collins, *Good to Great* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 36.

<sup>132</sup> [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu epub/pdf/placemat\\_archive/isaf\\_placemat\\_090608.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu epub/pdf/placemat_archive/isaf_placemat_090608.pdf) (accessed January 3, 2011)

<sup>133</sup> Wikipedia "International Security Assistance Force"  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\\_Security\\_Assistance\\_Force](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistance_Force) (accessed January 11, 2011)

<sup>134</sup> Ingrid Rader, "Shaping the Information Environment in Afghanistan: Understanding and Addressing Counter-Insurgency Information Challenges through Bottom-up, Collaborative planning in the Future Operations Cross Functional Team, ISAF Joint Command" *Small Wars Journal*, (July 2, 2010), 5, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/466-rader.pdf> (accessed February 22, 2010)

<sup>135</sup> Ingrid Rader, "Shaping the Information Environment in Afghanistan: Understanding and Addressing Counter-Insurgency Information Challenges through Bottom-up, Collaborative planning in the Future Operations Cross Functional Team, ISAF Joint Command" *Small Wars Journal*, (July 2, 2010), 5, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/466-rader.pdf> (accessed February 22, 2010)

## Notes on Sources

As the footnotes in the text suggest, there are very few secondary sources dealing with operational command in COIN or General McChrystal's command of ISAF. At this point, the documentary record of the period of General's McChrystal's command is confined to official texts and products of journalism. There are however, many sources that deal with this topic in the periphery. The situation in Afghanistan is widely written about as are the topics of culture and COIN. One of the challenges associated with writing this paper was to synthesize these various works and apply them to the situation that General McChrystal faced in Afghanistan. Where there were gaps in information, interviews were completed, albeit from a predominantly American perspective.

In terms of primary sources, General McChrystal's *Assessment*, *Initial Guidance*, and subsequent *COIN Guidance* were indispensable in gaining insight into the situation in Afghanistan and more importantly into his thinking. Furthermore, the interviews he completed with *60 Minutes* and *Charlie Rose* provided amplification of his mindset and thinking. The interviews that followed with General McChrystal, Command Sergeant-Major Hall and Brigadier-General Vance galvanized the research completed using the aforementioned sources.

The number of sources about Afghanistan has increased exponentially over the past five years. Seth Jones' *In the Graveyard of Empires* effectively links contemporary Afghan history with recent U.S. and NATO intervention. Coupled with primary sources and personal experience this work was sufficient in providing a balanced perspective in determining the situation facing General McChrystal and ISAF in 2009.

There are ample sources on the subject of COIN. One of the most useful sources for this project was the recently published anthology of short essays about a variety of aspects surrounding COIN entitled, *Understanding Counterinsurgency*, edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney. David Kilcullen's recent work, *Counterinsurgency* was also extremely useful. Linking culture and COIN, Colonel Robert Cassidy's *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* was an invaluable resource in highlighting the effects of cultural asymmetry in COIN efforts in the recent past. Last, Mark Moyar's book, *The Challenge of Command* provided many historical examples of effective and ineffective leadership practices during past COIN campaigns.

The works of John Kotter were essential in highlighting the practical challenges facing organizations as they seek change. Edgar Schien's model outlined in the 4<sup>th</sup> edition of *Organizational Culture and Leadership* was adopted as the analytical model through which to consider General McChrystal's actions. His insights throughout this book represent a wide body of knowledge accumulated throughout a career of studying organizational culture and change. Reading the works of Kotter and Schien in tandem provided a balanced perspective on the intricacies of change.

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